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'RESIDUAL DOUBT' IN CAPrrAL SENTENCING: No DOUBT iT IS AN
APPROPRIATE MITIGATING FACTOR
Residual doubt is any remaining or lingering doubt a jury has
concerning the defendant's guilt despite having been satisfied "be-
yond a reasonable doubt."' In certain states, the jury may consider
residual doubt as a non-statutory mitigating factor.2
"Mitigating factors" are those relating to the capital
defendant's "character, or record and any circumstance of the of-
fense, "3 and are usually listed within the state's capital sentencing
1. See Smith v Balkeom, 600 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
882 (1982). The Fifth Circuit stated:
The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any doubt whatsoever.
There may be no reasonable doubt - doubt based on reason - and yet some
genuine doubt exists. It may reflect a mere possibility; it may be the whimsy
of one juror or several. Yet this whimsical doubt - this absence of absolute
certainty - can be real.
Id.
2. Any limitation by the state as to what mitigating circumstances can be argued is
constitutionally prohibited. "Mhe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-
fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604-05 (1977) (striking down Ohio's statutory list of mitigating factors, which was
limited to only three specific factors, as incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding unconstitutional
a statutory barrier to consideration of mental retardation); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a judicial barrier to considerations of youth and fami-
ly background).
Consequently, a state statutory list of mitigating factors usually will include a general
"catchall" provision so that Lockett is not violated. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
2929.04(B)(7) (Baldwin 1992) ("Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of wheth-
er the offender should be sentenced to death.").
3. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Lockett established the constitutional doctrine in capital
sentencing of "individualized consideration," which "mandates that the sentencer be al-
lowed to consider all evidence concerning the offender and the offense that might argue
for a sentence less than death." Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guid-
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statute.4 Typically, capital sentencing schemes require the jury to
weigh the "aggravating circumstances"' of the crime against any
"mitigating circumstances" and recommend a life or death sentence
accordingly.6
The purpose of this note is to advocate the use of residual
doubt in capital sentencing as logical and necessary, and to provide
guidelines for the practical application of residual doubt in mitiga-
tion.
The first section will examine the treatment of the residual
doubt issue by the United States Supreme Court.7 The Court has
never recognized an Eighth Amendment right to argue this issue,
leaving the decision regarding the admission of a residual doubt
argument to state determination.'
ed Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147,
1148 (1991) [hereinafter Sundby, The Lockett Paradox] (discussing the tension between
certain constitutional capital sentencing doctrines). Another capital sentencing doctrine is
.guided discretion," which requires that "the sentencer's discretion be narrowly guided as
to which circumstances subject a defendant to the imposition of the death penalty." Id.
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
4. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Baldwin 1992) (providing statutory
list of mitigating factors). But see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.07(b) § 19.03
(West 1981) (containing no specific statutory mitigating factors but instead requiring that
the jury answer affirmatively to "Special Issues" in order to impose the death sentence);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas sentencing procedure). Exam-
pies of statutory mitigating factors include the youth of the offender, that the defendant
was not the principle offender, and that the offense would not have occurred had the
defendant not been under "duress, coercion, or strong provocation." OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2929.04(B)(2), (4), (6).
5. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Baldwin 1992). Examples of aggravat-
ing circumstances are that the offense was committed for hire; the victim was a police
officer, the offense occurred during the commission of certain felonies, where the defen-
dant was the principal offender or the offense was committed with prior calculation and
design. Id. at §§ 2929.04(A)(2), (6), (7).
6. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)
(West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Baldwin 1992). All three statutes
require a death sentence if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances. The Supreme Court has upheld such statutes mandating a death sentence if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299 (1990). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990) (only requiring the
factfimder to consider, but not weigh, all the aggravating and mitigating evidence). Al-
though usually a jury's recommendation is binding, some states allow an "override" proce-
dure by which the trial judge can impose a sentence contrary to what the jury recom-
mended. See, e.g., Spanziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (upholding Florida's proce-
dure allowing the judge to override the jury's recommendation of a life sentence).
7. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); infra notes 15-58 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of residual doubt).
8. See infra notes 15-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
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The second section of this note discusses how states have
treated the issue.9 Not all states permit the consideration of re-
sidual doubt in capital sentencing, and in those which do, judges
often refuse to give an instruction or do so inconsistently.'"
This note advocates the use of residual doubt based on the
following arguments. First, residual doubt is both logical and rele-
vant in capital sentencing." Second, because juries currently apply
residual doubt in their capital sentencing decisions, it is an "opera-
tive" mitigating factor. 2 Third, residual doubt provides an addi-
tional safeguard necessary in capital cases, because the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is not infallible, and death is irrevoca-
ble. 3 Finally, this note provides a framework within which re-
sidual doubt can be practically and efficiently applied, including a
proposed jury instruction. 4
I. CONSTITUTIONAL TRFATMENT OF RESIDUAL DOUBT
Until recently, federal courts generally accepted the concept of
residual doubt.'5 However, in the 1988 case of Franklin v.
Lynaugh,16 the United States Supreme Court placed in doubt the
deference to the states on the residual doubt issue).
9. See infra notes 59-89 and accompanying text (discussing state treatment of residual
doubt and providing case examples).
10. Not only is there disparate treatment among the states, but also within them, result-
ing in the inconsistent sentencing of capital defendants. See infra notes 70-89 and accom-
panying text (illustrating this proposition by contrasting two recent Ohio Supreme Court
cases that reached contrary conclusions on the residual doubt issue).
11. See infra notes 96-111.
12. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRM. L. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter Geimer & Amsterdam]; infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing
the results of Geimer and Amsterdam's study on capital jury sentencing recommendations
and how their study demonstrates that juries find residual doubt a relevant mitigating
factor).
13. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Bedau & Radelet]; infra notes
141-60 and accompanying text (discussing a study conducted by Professors Bedau and
Radelet that supports the proposition that there is a disturbingly high risk of erroneous
conviction in capital cases). See also infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that the risk of erroneous conviction becomes less tolerable when the sentence is
irrevocable and that appellate procedures do not alone provide sufficient protection to the
innocent).
14. See infra notes 183-216 and accompanying text.
15. See Margery Malkin Koosed, Franklin v. Lynaugh: Can Lingering Doubt Linger
Longer?, THE CHAMPIoN, Nov. 1988, 46, 46 [hereinafter, Koosed, Lingering Doubt] (dis-
cussing federal court acceptance of and reliance on residual doubt).
16. 487 U.S. 164 (1988). At trial, Franklin argued that he had been mistakenly identi-
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future role of residual doubt as a mitigating factor.1 7 The issue in
Franklin was whether a Texas sentencing jury's consideration of
two "Special Issues," absent consideration of the defendant's spe-
cially requested instructions, violated the defendant's Eighth
Amendment right to have mitigating evidence presented at capital
sentencing.1t At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury
was instructed to answer two "Special Issues": 1) whether the
murder had been deliberate and with the reasonable expectation
that death would result; and 2) whether a probability existed that
Franklin posed a continuing danger to society. 9 The jury was
also instructed that if it answered affirmatively to both, the death
sentence would be imposed.2"
Earlier in the sentencing proceedings, Franklin had submitted
five "special requested" jury instructions to guide the jury in its
consideration of the Special Issues.21 Essentially, these instructions
stated that any mitigating evidence could warrant a negative answer
to either question.' The judge refused to give these instructions,
fled as the person who had stabbed the victim, or in the alternative, that the victim's
death had resulted from medical mistreatment and not from the infliction of the wounds.
Id. at 168.
17. Id See also Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15 (examining the extent of the
Supreme Court's limitations on the use of residual doubt in light of Franklin).
18. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 170-71. The only mitigating evidence Franklin presented
during the sentencing phase of his trial was that his-disciplinary record for previous incar-
cerations had been without incident. Id. at 168. The State presented the following evi-
dence at the penalty phase: 1) the testimony of four police officers that Franklin had a
poor reputation for abiding by the law; 2) a prior rape conviction; and 3) the testimony
of a witness that Franklin had raped her before he committed the rape for which he
subsequently was convicted. Id.
19. Id. at 168-69 n.3. The exact presentation of the Special Issues was as follows:
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct of the Defendant, Donald Gene Franklin, that caused the death of Mary
Margaret Moran, was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that the death of the deceased or another would result?
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that there is
a probability that the Defendant, Donald Gene Franklin, would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?
Id. (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 168-69.
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 169-70. The relevant portion of these requested instructions stated:
You are instructed that any evidence which, in your opinion, mitigates
against the imposition of the Death Penalty, including any aspect of the
Defendant's character or record, and any of the circumstances of the commis-
sion of the offense . . . may be sufficient to cause you to have a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the true answer to any of the Special Issues is
"Yes"; and in the event such evidence does cause you to have such a reason-
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and instead told the jury to "remember all the instructions that the
Court has previously given you and be guided by them."23 The
jury answered "Yes" to both Special Issues, and the death penalty
was imposed.24 The Texas courts later affirmed both the convic-
tion and the death sentence.25 Franklin then filed a federal habeas
action contesting this decision.26 The District Court denied habeas
relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.27
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider the
Eighth Amendment issue, and whether the denial of Franklin's in-
structions had violated a constitutional right to present mitigating
evidence at capital sentencing.2" Franklin argued that this denial
prevented the jury from considering any residual doubt concerning:
1) Franklin's "identity as the murderer;, 29  2) "the extent to
which... [Franklin's] actions (as opposed to medical mistreat-
ment) actually caused the victim's death;" 30 and 3) "the extent to
which ... [his] actions were intended to result in the victim's
death."31 Franklin further argued that Lockhart v. McCree32  es-
tablished such a right to argue residual doubt during sentencing.13
Rejecting Franklin's interpretation of Lockhart, a divided Court
affirmed the lower court's verdict and sentence. 34
The plurality,35 in an opinion by Justice White, stated that no
able doubt, you should answer the Issue "No."
Id. at 169 n.4.
23. Id. at 170 (citation omitted). One previous instruction had been that the jury must
base its verdict on all the evidence. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1987), aftd, 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
28. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1988).
29. Id. at 172 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. Also included in Franklin's argument was the assertion that the jury did not
adequately consider his good disciplinary record. Id. at 177. The holding on this issue is
not discussed here as it is irrelevant to this note's topic.
32. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). In Lockhart the Supreme Court addressed the issue of wheth-
er it is unconstitutional to exclude for cause "prospective jurors whose opposition to the
death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of
their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase . . . ." l at 165. This question had been
left open by the Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1986). l The Court in
Lockhart held that such exclusion was not unconstitutional. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 184.
The Court stated that a jury selected using this process is constitutionally fair "so long as
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to
the facts of the particular case." Ie.
33. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 173.
34. Id. at 167.
35. The plurality included: Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
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prior Supreme Court decision recognized any constitutional right to
the consideration of residual doubt as a mitigating factor.
36
Franklin's reliance on Lockhart v. McCree was misplaced because
the Lockhart Court did not endorse residual doubt but merely stat-
ed that, if allowed, "such doubts will inure to the defendant's
benefit."3 1 In addition, residual doubt is not a constitutionally
mandated mitigating factor as it is not related to the defendant's
character, record, or any other circumstance of the event.3
The plurality then stated that "most importantly," even if it
had recognized such a right, there was no "violation of it in this
case" because the trial court had not impaired Franklin's "exercise
of this 'right."' 39 The trial court had not denied Franklin the op-
portunity to argue residual doubt to the jury, nor did Franklin offer
any such argument.4" The plurality noted that the proposed in-
structions did not explicitly discuss residual doubt.41 Therefore,
the denial of Franklin's suggested instructions did not impair con-
sideration of residual doubt.42
Next, the plurality addressed residual doubt as to causation of
death and the defendant's intent.43 In their view, both kinds of
doubt related to the degree of culpability. 4 Since Special Issue
Number One required the jury to find that Franklin acted deliber-
ately, these residual doubts could have been considered by the jury
in answering it.45 The plurality ended its analysis by stating that
Justice Kennedy. Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 165 ("This Court has never held that a capital defendant has a constitutional
right to an instruction telling the jury to revisit the question of his guilt as a basis for
mitigation.").
37. Id. at 173. In Lockhart, residual doubt was discussed in the context of unitary
juries in bifurcated capital trials. Lockhart v. MeCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180 (1986). The jury
who convicted the defendant would then sit for the sentencing phase. Any residual doubt
the jury had at the conviction phase would benefit the defendant, a benefit which the
defendant would not have if there were two different juries. IL at 181.
38. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982),
and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 174-75 and n.7 (no argument was made on residual doubt during the presen-
tation of mitigating evidence or at closing except for a general reference to human falli-
bility).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 175.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 175-76 (stating that the jury could have found that because of these doubts
the criminal act, though sufficiently intentional to justify a guilty verdict, was not deliber-
ate enough to merit the death sentence).
[Vol. 43:213
RESIDUAL DOUBT IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
because Franklin's proposed instructions provided no guidance on
these doubts, their denial did not impair the jury's ability to con-
sider such doubts.'
In her concurrence,47 Justice O'Connor stated that the residu-
al doubt claim "fails, not because the Texas scheme allowed for
consideration of 'residual doubt' by the sentencing body, but rather
because the Eighth Amendment does not require it."'  Although
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that in some state capital
sentencing schemes a defendant might benefit from such consider-
ation of residual doubt,49 the Court has never required states "to
adopt such procedures.""° For Justice O'Connor, residual doubt
did not fall within the scope of mitigating factors which must be
considered under the Eighth Amendment."1
The Supreme Court provided the following regarding constitu-
tional treatment of residual doubt in Franklin. First, the Supreme
Court expressly refused to recognize residual doubt as a constitu-
tionally mandated mitigating factor.5 2 This, however, must be
qualified in that only two members of the Supreme Court, Justices
O'Connor and Blackmun, expressly rejected residual doubt as an
Eighth Amendment requirement.53 The plurality merely deferred to
prior decisions where residual doubt was not expressly mandat-
ed.54
Second, a majority of the Court, including the dissene and
46. Id. at 176.
47. Id. at 183-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).
48. Id. at 187.
49. Id at 187-88 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986)).
50. Id. at 188. Justice O'Connor stated that "to the contrary," the Court has allowed
states to have separate sentencing bodies on remand. Id. (citing ante at 173 n.6 (plurality
opinion)).
51. Id. at 188. Justice O'Connor wrote:
"Residual doubt" is not a fact about the defendant or the circumstances
of the crime. It is instead a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind
that exists somewhere between "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "absolute
certainty." Petitioner's "residual doubt" claim is that States must permit capital
sentencing bodies to demand proof of guilt to "an absolute certainty" before
imposing the death sentence. Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of
this heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing.
Id
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 187.
54. Id. at 182.
55. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens, is quite brief in its treatment of
the residual doubt issue. Id. at 189 (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). It
merely stated that "the plurality explains why in this case there was no interference with
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the plurality, found that regardless of whether residual doubt is an
Eighth Amendment right, there was no violation in this case be-
cause Texas had not interfered with the defendant's ability to argue
the issue to the jury.56
Arguably, the Franklin Court left undecided the issue of
whether a state's interference in the defendant's ability to argue
residual doubt - i.e., by precluding either any argument or merely
a jury instruction on the issue - is unconstitutional.57 Unfortu-
nately, however, though the Justices in Franklin may not have
closed the door completely on the constitutionality of residual
doubt, it appears the issue has been left to the states to decide.5
8
any right petitioner may have had under the Eighth Amendment to have the jury consider
'residual doubt' in making its sentencing determination. I do not disagree with that con-
clusion." I The dissent makes no mention of Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id Justices
Brennan and Marshall, in fact, in another case expressed approval of residual doubt as a
mitigating factor. See Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 883 (1984) (proposing that court
should grant certiorari to decide if not allowing the defendant to argue mitigating factors
during capital sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment).
56. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174 (no state interference because the trial court in no
way limited the defendant's ability to argue residual doubt to the jury, the defendant did
not argue residual doubt at sentencing, and the defendant's proffered jury instructions did
not mention residual doubt). Perhaps this is the only reason why the dissent, Justices
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, found there to be no violation. See id. at 189.
One commentator has made some interesting arguments regarding the distinctions the
Court appeared to have made between the "types" of residual doubt: identity, causation,
and deliberateness. See Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 47 (discussing the
effects of Franklin on residual doubt argument). First, whereas the concurrence had
lumped these three "types" of residual doubt together and denied any general right, the
plurality's comment that no prior decisions recognized residual doubt as constitutionally
mandated was made only about identity residual doubt. Id at 48. As for the elements of
causation and deliberateness, the plurality relied only on "the lack of state interference."
Id at 47-48. (The idea of lack of state interference was based on the fact that Special
Issue One allowed consideration of residual doubt as to deliberateness.) Potentially, then, a
majority of the Franklin Court "would agree that residual doubts about deliberateness and
causation are constitutionally relevant mitigating factors." Id at 48 (emphasis omitted). In
addition, this commentator further proposes that the distinction between identity residual
doubt and the other types is dictum because the actual basis of the plurality's holding is
based on the absence of state interference. Id
57. Cf. id., at 47-48 ("[I]f consideration of these residual doubts [as to deliberateness
and causation] is adequately raised by defense counsel in a request for specific instruc-
tions, and consideration by the sentencer is not otherwise assured by the instructions actu-
ally given, an eighth amendment violation will occur.").
58. This will be discussed in the next section; residual doubt in fact has been preclud-
ed completely from mitigation argument in certain states. See infra notes 67-69 and ac-
companying text. No Supreme Court decision subsequent to Franklin has even mentioned
such states' capital sentencing schemes, and in fact residual doubt has been barely men-
tioned. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 'U.S. 302, 320 (1989) (merely noting that in
Franklin a majority of the Court "agreed that 'residual doubt' as to Franklin's guilt was
[Vol. 43:213
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Residual doubt cannot be neglected as an important factor in capi-
tal sentencing deliberations in those states where it may be al-
lowed.
II. STATES AND RESIDUAL DOUBT
Most states that allow capital punishment have statutes con-
taining a list of mitigating factors that the capital sentencer may
consider. 9 The language of the statute usually indicates that the
sentencer is not limited to those factors listed." Although no state
statute specifies residual doubt as a statutory mitigating factor,
some jurisdictions allow the defendant to argue residual doubt to
the jury."1 In these jurisdictions, however, the trial court will fre-
quently decline to instruct the jury on residual doubt.62 In uphold-
ing such a decision, the California Supreme Court stated the fol-
lowing:
The fair opportunity to present relevant evidence and to
argue forbearance thereon sufficiently preserves the
defendant's interest in having the jury consider fully all
not a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor"). The tone of the Court's comments in
Penry, coupled with the fact that the composition of the Supreme Court has changed
since Franklin, indicates that state capital sentencing schemes precluding residual doubt
would be upheld today.
Arguably, leaving the residual doubt issue for states to decide is consistent with a
general trend of deference by the Supreme Court on matters of criminal law, both sub-
stantive and procedural. See Sundby, The Lockett Paradox, supra note 3, at 1191. This
commentator has stated:
The Court's reluctance to impose constitutional controls on the proce-
dures that states use in their criminal justice systems pales in comparison to its
unwillingness to delineate constitutional principles of substantive law. The Court
has repeatedly affirmed its deference to the states in defining substantive crimi-
nal law and, as a result, has developed only the most cursory constitutional
limits.
Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L. J. 457, 477 (1989) [hereinafter Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule].
59. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Baldwin 1992) (listing the mitigat-
ing factors that should be weighed against the aggravating circumstances of the offense).
60. See id. § 2929.04(B)(7) ("Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of
whether the offender should be sentenced to death."). See supra note 2 (explaining why
statutory lists of mitigating factors cannot be limited).
61. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991) (court permitted defendant
to argue residual doubt as to guilt to the jury); Taylor v. State, 404 S.E.2d 255 (Ga.
1991) (observing that the trial court allowed defendant to argue residual doubt as to the
deliberateness of the act to the jury).
62. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 384 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
945 (1992) (holding the defendant's fair opportunity to present mitigating evidence suffi-
cient without a specific court instruction on how the jury should consider the evidence).
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germane aspects of the offense and the offender without
requiring additional instructional guidance as to certain
extenuating circumstances .... We therefore conclude
that, while a defendant may not be precluded from offer-
ing . . . [residual doubt] or arguing its relevance in mitiga-
tion, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require
the jury be instructed to consider residual doubt as to the
extent of his participation in the offense, except as statuto-
rily provided.63
In other cases, though denying the requested instructions, the
court has given its own instruction on the issue.64 In both types
of cases, where courts deny residual doubt instructions and those
where courts give their own instructions, the courts seem to take
their cue from Franklin v. Lynaugh: the lack of interference means
that the defendant is not precluded from arguing residual doubt.65
In other words, as long as the court did not prevent the defendant
from making a residual doubt argument to the jury, there was no
error.' The fact that residual doubt is at least allowed in a de-
fense mitigation argument in these jurisdictions demonstrates that
residual doubt is a relevant mitigating factor.
In contrast, other jurisdictions, having adopted a much stricter
approach, exclude residual doubt from the defendant's mitigation
argument.67  Courts in these jurisdictions stress the Franklin
plurality's view on identity residual doubt and the concurrence's as
63. Id. (citations omitted) (The statute referred to is CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3, factor
(j) (West 1992), which instructs the jury to consider "[w]hether or not the defendant was
an accomplice to the offense and [whether] his participation in the commission of the of-
fense was relatively minor."). See also Taylor, 404 S.E.2d at 262 ("It is well settled that
a trial court is not required in its charge to 'identify mitigating circumstances offered by
the defendant.'" (citations omitted)).
64. See, e.g., Cooper, 809 P.2d at 910 (Cal. 1991) (instructing the jury to consider
"[w]hether or not you have any lingering doubt as to Mr. Cooper's guilt").
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66. See Cooper, 809 P.2d at 910; Cox, 809 P.2d at 384. In both cases the courts, us-
ing Franklin as support, held that there was no error because the jury was allowed to
hear a defense argument on residual doubt.
67. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755, 776-77 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. CL 295 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (defendant denied
opportunity to argue residual doubt as to identity to the jury). See also Tafero v. Dugger,
520 So. 2d 287, 289 n.1 (Fla. 1988) ("Residual or lingering doubt is not an appropriate
mitigating circumstance."). Cf. Pinkney v. State, 538 So. 2d 329, 358 (Miss. 1988), cert
granted and vacated, 494 U.S. 1075 (1990) (trial judge instructed defendant that he could
not argue his innocence to the jury during his personal address, but allowed defense
counsel to present residual doubt during closing arguments).
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to all residual doubt.68 Residual doubt in these jurisdictions, then,
is not considered a "'mitigating circumstance' because it is not a
fact about the defendant's character or the circumstances of his
crime which may call for a penalty less than death." 69 These
courts refuse to find residual doubt relevant at the sentencing
phase.
Two recent Ohio decisions demonstrate the inconsistent treat-
ment of residual doubt even within one state which allows defen-
dants to make residual doubt arguments. In State v. Watson,7" the
Ohio Supreme Court manifested itself as a liberal interpreter of the
residual doubt issue. During the trial phase the defendant was
convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and "murder
in the course of robbery."71 At the sentencing phase, the defense
presented no mitigating evidence, relying primarily on residual
doubt, arguing that the jury was wrong and "Watson would ulti-
mately be vindicated."7 2 Upon the jury's recommendation, the trial
court sentenced the defendant to death. 3 The appellate court up-
held both the conviction and the sentence.74 The Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the death sentence and
remanded for an imposition of a life sentence.75
In its review, the court asked whether the aggravating circum-
stances outweighed the mitigating factors.76 The court stated that
residual doubt was a proper mitigating factor for jury consider-
68. See supra notes 31 and 56 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the three types of residual doubt: identity, deliberateness, and causation).
69. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d at 777.
70. 572 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1991).
71. Id at 102. In order for an offense to be punishable by death under the Ohio stat-
ute, one or more aggravating circumstances must be included in the indictment and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Baldwin
1992). The aggravating circumstance that had been proved in Watson was that "[t]he of-
fense was committed while the offender was committing, [or] attempting to commit...
aggravated robbery .... " Id. § 2929.04(A)(7).
72. Watson, 572 N.E.2d at 111.
73. Id. at 102.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 111.
76. Id. at 103. Pursuant to the Ohio statute, the supreme court undertakes a three part
review of a capital case. OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2929.05(A) (Baldwin 1992). First, the
conviction itself is reviewed. Id. Second, the appropriateness of the death sentence is
determined by an independent weighing of the evidence to see whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. Id. Third, there is a proportionality review
to determine whether a death sentence is excessive by comparing the case at bar to simi-
lar cases. Id. See also Watson, 572 N.E.2d at 109 (explaining the court's reviewing pro-
cedure in capital cases).
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ation7 because there had been evidence presented at the convic-
tion phase that countered the prosecution's case against Watson.7"
Despite the fact that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty
verdict, the "events at the penalty phase of Watson's trial could
have affected the jury's choice between a life and a death sentence
in the face of any residual doubts they may have had."79
In the more recent decision of State v. Bonnell, however, the
Ohio Supreme Court flatly rejected the defendant's argument on
appeal that the trial court should have instructed the jury on residu-
al doubt when the defendant had made a residual doubt argument
to the jury at mitigation.'* In a single paragraph the Court stated
that "[t]he issue of residual doubt was addressed in the majority
opinion, and the concurring and dissenting opinion, in State v.
Watson .... In the case at bar, no further comment on this issue
is warranted as there is no residual doubt of appellant's guilt."'"
The court found "the evidence of appellant's guilt to be over-
whelming."8 2 Arguably the court's analysis in Bonnell is not in-
consistent with the one made in Watson because the court there
also evaluated the evidence and made an independent finding on
the issue of residual doubt.8 3 Thus, it appears that the only differ-
ence between the cases is the weight of the evidence on indepen-
dent review and a subsequent finding on residual doubt based on
this evidence.
Yet, the dissenting opinion in Bonnell revealed that the jury
probably harbored some residual doubt after convicting the defen-
77. Id. at II1 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986)).
78. Watson, 572 N.E.2d at 111. Evidence included four "disinterested" eyewitnesses
who testified that the man running from the scene was not the defendant. Id. One woman
testified that the man she saw running was "absolutely not" the defendant. Id. In addition,
there was some speculation as to the credibility of one of the main witnesses, and some
circumstantial evidence that implicated in the crime someone other than the defendant. Id.
Another individual, Henderson, was charged with complicity in the robbery. Id. The main
government witness was Henderson's step-sister. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added) (noting that because the jury received an instruction that its
penalty verdict was only a recommendation and "where witness credibility played a crucial
role in convicting the defendant, the jury may have felt that any residual doubt would be
confirmed or denied by the judge").
80. State v. Bormell, 573 N.E.2d 1082, 1087 (Ohio 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1205 (1992).
81. Bonnell, 573 N.E.2d at 1087 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 1086.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio's review procedure in
capital cases).
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dant.' Apparently during the penalty deliberation the jury sent a
note to the judge that asked "[clan doubt and 'not fully disclosed'
evidence (suggested but not proven) be included under mitigating
factors?" 85 The trial court, which had not given a residual doubt
instruction, responded to the jury: "[Y]ou have heard all of the law
and you have to apply the law to the facts as you, the jury, finds
them."8 6 To the dissent, this note indicated that the jury was con-
cerned about whether residual doubt should be relevant to its delib-
eration. 7
In contrast to Watson, however, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Bonnell was much stricter in its analysis of residual doubt. Where
the court in Watson reversed the death penalty after considering
residual doubt in its own independent review, the Bonnell court
affirmed a death sentence in spite of indications that the jury itself
might have harbored residual doubt. These two decisions demon-
strate the inconsistent treatment of residual doubt even within one
state.
The willingness of a state supreme court to uphold the trial
court's refusal to explicitly instruct on residual doubt appears to
demonstrate an unwillingness to completely accept residual doubt
as a relevant mitigating factor. This sort of "compromise" poten-
tially renders residual doubt useless in some cases where the jury,
despite having such a doubt, does not understand that they may
apply it.88 In addition, the disparate treatment of the residual
doubt issue both within and among states leads to an inconsistent
application" of the death penalty.89
84. Bonnell, 573 N.E.2d at 1089-90 (Brown, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1090.
86. Il
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing the need to instruct the
jury on residual doubt whenever the defendant argues it at the mitigation phase).
89. This seems contrary to the constitutional mandate that the. sentencer's discretion be
guided in order to prevent arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (holding that capital pun-
ishment is constitutionally permissible, and that social science data indicating that black
defendants are more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants is not evi-
dence of arbitrary or slanted sentencing); I&. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); let at
314 (Marshall, L, concurring).
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I. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF RESIDUAL DOUBT IN
MMGATION
Opponents to the use of residual doubt as a mitigating factor
rely essentially on two propositions. Their primary argument is that
consideration of residual doubt after guilt has been determined is
illogical and irrelevant. Further, they assert that the use of residual
doubt defeats the policy goals behind capital punishment.
Proponents of the use of residual doubt in the mitigation phase
counter that not only is residual doubt logical and relevant, but in
fact it is already acting as an operative factor. Additionally, it is
necessary as an additional safeguard in light of the irrevocability of
capital sentencing. These arguments are explored in the following
sections.
A. Logic and Relevancy
In denying a residual doubt argument at mitigation, the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
A convicted defendant cannot be "a little bit guilty." It
is unreasonable for a jury to say in one breath that a
defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and, in the next breath, to say someone else may
have done it, so we recommend mercy.*
This statement reflects the proposition that the use of residual
doubt as a mitigating factor is illogical and irrelevant since the
defendant's guilt has already been established at the conviction
phase. The purpose of the sentencing phase is to consider whether
other circumstances about the crime and the defendant merit a
lesser sentence than death.9' Justice O'Connor stated in Franklin
v. Lynaugh that "'residual doubt' is not a fact about the defendant
or the circumstances of the crime." 92 Thus, a residual doubt argu-
90. Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 953 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982).
91. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (de-
fining mitigating circumstances as facts concerning the defendant's character or back-
ground, or the circumstances of the charged offense).
92. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 474 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See al-
so State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 11.2 (Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J., dissenting). Justice
Resnick stated that residual doubt is not a relevant mitigating factor because it does not
relate to "the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and back-
ground" of the defendant. Id. (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(7) (Baldwin
1986)).
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ment at mitigation is viewed as superfluous and inappropriate.
In addition, opponents to the use of residual doubt as a miti-
gating factor argue that if a juror has any remaining doubt after
applying the reasonable doubt standard, this doubt is not grounded
in reason, but rather, is "whimsical" in nature.93 They further as-
sert that a juror's whimsical doubt is not necessarily based on real-
ity.' 4 The "beyond a reasonable doubt" rule is based on a reason-
able evaluation of the facts.95 The argument concludes, therefore,
with the contention that if residual doubt is allowed as a mitigating
factor, the jury might be inclined to sentence individuals to life on
a whim.
Further analysis, however, demonstrates that residual doubt is a
logical and relevant factor to consider at the mitigation phase, even
though it does not fit the classical definition of a mitigating factor.
1. Logic of Residual Doubt
The standard of proof which must be met for conviction is
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."' Since this standard of proof
is not as demanding, as a "beyond any doubt" standard, absolute
certainty is not required for a guilty verdict.97 Therefore, a jury
may convict a defendant, even though the jury may entertain some
doubt as to whether the accused is actually guilty of every element
of the offense.9"
This "lingering" or "residual" doubt is not necessarily "fanci-
ful" or "whimsical" in reality." It can be genuine, based on the
93. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (defining "whimsical").
94. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(D) (Baldwin 1992) ("mere possible doubt"
can be "imaginary").
95. Id. (reasonable doubt is "based on reason and common sense").
96. The 'beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was constitutionally recognized in In re
Winship, where the Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
97. See Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 515-19 (1975) (indicating that the modern "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard results in a lower burden of persuasion than the "beyond any
doubt" standard which was once utilized). Even Justice O'Connor, a staunch opponent of
residual doubt as an appropriate mitigating factor, recognizes that residual doubt "exists
somewhere between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and 'absolute certainty.'" Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982) ("The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any doubt whatsoever").
99. Black's Law Dictionary provides the following definition for "whim": "Passing fan-
cy; an impulse or caprice. Used in jury instruction in cautioning the jurors to avoid re-
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evidence of the case, and not on the imagination of the juror. t
The standard Ohio Jury Instruction explaining "reasonable doubt"
reflects the proposition that any remaining doubt can be either
"whimsical" or actual:
REASONABLE DOUBT IS PRESENT when, after you
have carefully considered and compared all the evidence,
you cannot say you are firmly convinced of the truth of
the charge. Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason
and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or
depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt."°
In sum, residual doubt is any remaining doubt, either "whimsi-
cal" or actual, that a jury retains despite having been satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the of-
fense charged."°
2. Relevancy of Residual Doubt
The mandate of individualized sentencing was established in
Lockett v. Ohio.103 In Lockett, Chief Justice Burger stated that the
imposition of the death penalty requires a higher degree of reliabil-
ity.'14 In an attempt to ensure this higher degree of reliability,
the Court deemed, as constitutionally relevant mitigating factors,
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." 0 5
Permitting residual doubt to be considered as a mitigating
turning a verdict based on anything but the evidence and its strength, not on the personal
whim or caprice of the jurors." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
100. See Smith, 660 F.2d at 580. The court in that case stated that "[tihere may be no
reasonable doubt - doubt based upon reason - and yet some genuine doubt exists." Id.
101. OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 403.50(1) (Anderson 1987) (emphasis added). See also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(D) (Baldwin 1992).
102. Distinguishing between whimsical and actual doubt becomes critical in the context
of capital sentencing. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (proposing that "whim-
sical" doubt is not an appropriate mitigating factor).
103. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). See also supra note 3 (discussing
Lockett).
104. Id. at 604 (explaining that because the death penalty is so qualitatively different
from any other sentence, a greater degree of reliability is necessary for its imposition).
105. Id. (concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require consideration of
such mitigating factors).
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factor is consistent with Lockett for two reasons. First, the consid-
eration of residual doubt can facilitate the achievement of Lockett's
requirement of individualized sentencing, thus ensuring a higher
degree of reliability in the capital sentencing process.t 6 One
commentator has stated "what could be more appropriate than to
consider the relative level of proof of guilt, and distinguish the
somewhat shaky case against one defendant from the airtight case
against another. To do otherwise would likely be a 'blind infliction
of the penalty of death."' °7
Second, residual doubt as to the defendant's guilt is arguably
an "aspect" of the "circumstances of the offense." ' Indeed, re-
sidual doubt is different from "traditional" mitigating circumstanc-
es."0 Yet it cannot be disputed that whether or not the defendant
actually committed the crime is a fact about the circumstances of
the offense."0 Thus, regardless of whether residual doubt con-
forms with traditional notions of what constitutes a mitigating
factor, residual doubt does comply with what Chief Justice Burger
deemed constitutionally "relevant" mitigating factors."'
B. Residual Doubt as an "Operative" Mitigating Factor
In addition to being a logical and relevant factor for mitigation,
residual doubt currently acts as a de facto, or "operative," mitigat-
106. See, Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 51.
107. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). For a more
extensive discussion explaining why a higher degree of reliability is desirable, if not nec-
essary, in capital sentencing, see infra notes 139-60 and accompanying text (discussing the
risk of erroneously convicting an innocent individual despite the use of the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof).
108. See Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 50 ("[W]hy isn't the identity ele-
ment [of residual doubt] just as much a 'circumstance of the crime' as the other ele-
ments?").
109. For example, that the offense would not have been committed had the defendant
not been under extreme emotional duress is a "traditional" mitigating circumstance. See,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(2) (Baldwin 1992). See also Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) and supra note 55 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's argument against the inclusion of residu-
al doubt in mitigation because it is not a fact about the circumstances of the offense).
110. See Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 50 (commenting that the element
of identity for the crime of murder cannot easily be distinguished from a lack of intent
or adequate participation in the crime, two elements which the Court has arguably consid-
ered to be circumstances of the crime in accomplice liability cases).
111. See Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this case,
Justice Marshall stated that "Eddings and Lockett entitle a defendant to a sentencer who
can consider all mitigating circumstances, whether or not they conform to traditional legal
categories." Id. at 923.
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ing factor because juries in fact consider residual doubt as a factor
in capital sentencing. As mentioned previously, some states do not
allow the defendant to argue residual doubt to the jury."2 Yet,
even in these states, the jury, on its own, may decide not to im-
pose a death sentence because it is not absolutely certain of the
defendant's guilt."3 Florida is one state where the defense may
not argue residual doubt during mitigation." 4 According to one
study, however, sixty-nine percent of Florida jurors interviewed" 5
post-sentencing confirmed that residual doubt about the guilt of the
defendant was the reason they had voted for a life sentence rather
than death." 6 In fact, the authors of that study stated that "[t]he
existence of some degree of doubt about the guilt of the accused
was the most often recurring explanatory factor in the life recom-
mendation cases studied.""7 The jurors in these cases believed
residual doubt was relevant and thus it became an "operative"
mitigating factor."'
In another study, 600 Georgia homicide cases were examined
112. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (explaining that those states which
do not permit a residual doubt argument view such doubt as an inappropriate mitigating
circumstance).
113. See Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in
Florida, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1985) [hereinafter Radelet, Rejecting the
Jury] (discussing Florida's statute allowing a judge to override a jury's recommendation
against death, and noting that "[a] jury's recommendation of life imprisonment may in
some cases ieflect doubt in the jury's mind about the defendant's degree of involvement
in the crime").
114. See, e.g., King v. State, 514 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1987) (stating that residual
doubt is not an appropriate nonstatutory mitigating circumstance), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1241 (1988).
115. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 9 (fifty-four of 120 total jurors from five
capital murder cases in which the jury recommendation was life, and from five in which
the recommendation was death were interviewed).
116. Id. at 28. In one of the cases where life was recommended, one juror interviewed
said some of the evidence presented at trial raised doubts in his mind as to whether
someone else had committed the homicide. Id. at 28, 29 & nn.l13-14. That juror stated:
"We found him guilty, there wasn't anybody else to put it on . . .but we didn't want to
execute him because some evidence might come out in the future about the other guy."
Id. at 29 (citation omitted). See also Michael Mello and Ruthann Robson, Judge Over
Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life In Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 31, 59 (1985) (proposing that the Florida Supreme Court's reversal of two first
degree murder convictions in Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982), which had
been imposed by the trial judge despite the unanimous recommendation of a life sentence
by the jury, suggests that the jury's decision was based upon residual doubt).
117. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 28 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 31 (commenting that as the impact of residual doubt as an operative mit-
igating factor becomes more manifest, it may prompt changes in the law).
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to determine whether there were any consistencies among those
cases in which the defendant received a death sentence." 9 The
cases spanned from 1973 to 1978, and encompassed each individu-
al arrested for and charged with murder, who subsequently received
a life or death sentence after trial, or a death sentence after plead-
ing guilty. 2 ' The author of this study found that although "homi-
cide cases show immense variety . .. [t]he death cases appeared to
differ from the others on three primary dimensions: (1) The Cer-
tainty the Defendant is a Deliberate Killer; (2) The 'Status' of the
Victim; [and] (3) The 'Heinousness' of the Killing."121
The first "dimension" reflects the sentencer's lingering doubt as
to both the identity of the killer and the deliberateness of the kill-
ing." 2 The author of the study determined that a lower degree of
certainty meant a greater likelihood that the defendant was sen-
tenced to life." 3 Therefore, even in those cases where the requi-
site "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was satisfied for con-
viction, any remaining doubt on the part of the sentencer appeared
to affect the sentence.
2 4
In addition, juries may often want to apply residual doubt as a
mitigating factor but may be hesitant to do so. For example, in
State v. Bonnell, 5 the jury's note manifested its concern about
its lingering doubt.'26 The trial court, however, refused to instruct
119. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1338-39 (1985) (stating that approximately one-sixth of the
defendants in those cases received death sentences).
120. Id. at 1338.
121. Id. at 1339 (emphasis added). "The 'status' of the victim relates primarily to the
relationship between the victim and the accused . . . . Stranger-to-stranger killings are
more 'prone' to death sentences . . . ." Id. at 1340.
122. See id. at 1339-40 (explaining that "'certainty' refers to the degree of assurance
that the accused was, in fact, the killer of the victim", while "deliberate" refers to the de-
gree of assurance that the killing was intentional).
123. Id. at 1340, 1343 (A "zero" rating, indicating a "relatively weak case in terms of
certainty and/or deliberateness", resulted in a drop in the death sentencing rate). See id. at
1339 (stating that "[i]f substantial doubts existed, the defendant would presumably have
been acquitted").
124. See id. at 1339-40 ("If substantial doubts [that the accused was not the killer]
existed, the defendant would presumably have been acquitted; the notion is, however, that
the threshold of certainty needed for a death sentence" is greater than that sufficient for a
guilty verdict.).
125. 573 N.E.2d 1082 (Ohio 1991).
126. Id. at 1090. See also supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing the
result of the Ohio Supreme Court's refusal to recognize as error the trial court's denial to
the jury's request for a residual doubt instruction, as well as the court's inconsistent
treatment of residual doubt within the state).
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on residual doubt and the jury recommended a death sentence.'27
Arguably, the jury interpreted the court's refusal to provide further
instruction on residual doubt as an inference that it was not to
apply it in sentencing."
The aforementioned studies and the jury note in the Bonnell
case demonstrate that residual doubt is an "operative" mitigating
factor. The logical conclusion then is that residual doubt should be
treated as a relevant and legitimate mitigating factor. Justice Mar-
shall stated the following:
The weight assigned to any element can only be a
function of the values of the community, for certainly there
is no "objective" formula. Once a mitigating circumstance
is considered, assigned weight, and determined to be suffi-
cient to'preclude death, the Constitution should allow no
"superior" authority to remove that circumstance from the
equation and impose death. 29
C. Policy Goals Of Capital Punishment
Opponents argue that if guilty defendants benefit from the use
of residual doubt as a mitigating factor, society's countervailing
interest in protecting itself from crime is disserved.' 3 This in-
terest is in reality a bundle of policy objectives which are intended
to be achieved through capital punishment.1
3 1
According to two commentators, the "minute risk" of erroneous
execution "is substantially outweighed by the protection that capital
127. Id. at 1090.
128. See id. at 1088 (arguing that the fact the jury imposed the death penalty after the
Court refused to instruct them on residual doubt indicates that the jury did not consider
residual doubt as a valid mitigating factor) and supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
129. Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920, 923-24 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disputing
the trial judge's override of the jury's recommendation for a life sentence because the
recommendation had been based on residual doubt).
130. See Sundby, Reasonable Doubt, supra note 58, at 460 (discussing how the balanc-
ing of societal interests of protecting the innocent and protecting society from crime has
resulted in the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof). See also Stephen J.
Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet
Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 156 (1988) [hereinafter Markman & Cassell] ("[O]ur
society's choices with respect to sentencing and other justice-related matters are based on
the benefits and hazards of the various options available.").
131. There are those, however, who argue that these policy objectives, in fact, are not
achieved by the death penalty. See Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An As-
sessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177
(1981) (stating that capital punishment is not a substantial deterrent).
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punishment affords to society through incapacitation, deterrence,
and just punishment." 32 Opponents also argue that the use of re-
sidual doubt might defeat the purpose of the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard by implicitly raising the standard of proof required
for imposition of a death sentence.
33
Yet, in fact the use of residual doubt as a mitigating factor
does not hinder the attainment of the policy goals supporting capi-
tal punishment. However, execution of an innocent person does not
further the policy goals of capital punishment." 4 Although there
is no guarantee that only innocent people would benefit from resid-
ual doubt, there is also no guarantee that only innocent people
benefit from the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.135 " While
both have the potential to benefit a guilty individual, there is sub-
stantially less damage done when a guilty person is sentenced to
life than when a guilty person is acquitted."3 As one commenta-
tor stated:
The risk of an arbitrary life sentence is of minimal
social disutility compared with the risk of an arbitrary
death sentence. Unlike the risk of acquitting a guilty per-
son, where society could be harmed by a dangerous person
walking the streets, the risk of an inappropriate life sen-
tence still incarcerates a defendant adjudged a danger to
society.
137
132. Markman & Cassell, supra note 130, at 152. The authors quote Ernest van den
Haag as saying that the death penalty is -justified" despite some erroneous executions
because "a net gain in justicer is produced. Id. at 156 n.217 (citing David Margolick, 25
Wrongfully Executed in U.S., Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1985, at A19).
133. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O'Connor, ., concurring).
Justice O'Connor stated that the "[p]etitioner's 'residual doubt' claim is that the States
must permit capital sentencing bodies to demand proof of guilt to 'an absolute certainty'
before imposing the death sentence. Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this
heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing." Id.
134. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to
Marlaan and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1989) [hereinafter Bedau &
Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility].
135. Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra -note 58, at 500 ("The undeniable cost of
the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule is that some guilty individuals
will avoid conviction . . . .
136. Linda E. Caher, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty Pro-
ceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 195, 219 (1991) (advocating
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the sentencing phase of a capital
trial).
137. Id. But see Markman & Cassell, supra note 130, at 152 (stating that life impris-
onment does not prevent some individuals from murdering while in prison).
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Therefore, whereas instituting a higher standard of proof for
conviction might upset the balance set by society,13 residual
doubt can provide additional protection to the defendant without
disrupting the balance of societal interests achieved by the reason-
able doubt standard. Because residual doubt can serve such desir-
able goals, none of the arguments advanced in opposition to its use
are ultimately persuasive.
D. Residual Doubt as a Necessary Safeguard in Capital
Sentencing
Due to the fallibility and irrevocability inherent in capital sen-
tencing, residual doubt is a necessary mitigating factor in capital
sentencing as an additional safeguard to protect the innocent.
1. Fallibility of the "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" Standard
Society has chosen to balance the dual interests of protecting
the innocent from wrongful conviction and protecting society from
crime by adopting the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." 39 As one commentator stated "[t]he presumption of inno-
cence and how far it extends is a manifestation of how great a
margin of error society is willing to tolerate."14° There may be,
138. See Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 58, at 459 (discussing why soci-
ety does not want a standard of "proof beyond any doubt").
139. Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 58, at 458 (discussing the constitu-
tional debate over the meaning of innocence). The prevailing view seems to be that the
interest in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction outweighs the risk of failing
to convict some of those guilty of committing a crime. Id at 461. That commentator
stated that "[w]hether treated as a moral, constitutional, or popular sentiment inquiry, the
greater injustice is almost universally shen in the conviction of the innocent." Id (foot-
notes omitted) (citing ROBIN A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 108-09 (1986) (punish-
ing the innocent is a greater "moral harm" than acquitting the guilty)). See also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (requiring due process protection of the defendant
unless an "utmost certainty" of guilt is established); CARLETON K. ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 286-87 (Scienta Verlag Aalen 1977) (1931) (there
is popular support for the presumption of innocence). There is, however, some opposition
to this notion that the superior interest is the prevention of erroneous conviction. See
Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 58, at 461 n.22 (citing 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 438 (1881) (hesitating to agree with the
notion that it is always better for ten guilty individuals to be acquitted); WILLIAM PALEY,
PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 359 (9th Am. ed. 1818) (convicting
the guilty is a superior interest and thus the erroneously convicted innocent individual
should be considered a necessary sacrifice)).
140. Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 58, at 462. Although the author notes
that "the greater injustice is almost universally seen in the conviction of the innocent," he
also states that few would think it "better to let one million guilty people go free than to
convict one innocent person." Id. at 461.
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however, an intolerable amount of error in convictions about which
society does not know. 141 Although there has been little empirical
research on this problem, 42 one comprehensive study has been
published, hereinafter referred to as the "Bedau-Radelet study".
143
This study includes 350 cases from the twentieth century where
defendants, convicted of capital and "potentially capital crimes,"
were later found to be innocent' 44
The study focuses exclusively on persons wrongfully charged
with homicide and rape.145 The study, categorized the evidence of
innocence as follows. The first category was comprised of deci-
sions by state officials that indicated a probability of inno-
cence. " s This category included legislative indemnity, executive
pardon, other executive action (e.g., commutation of sentence to
time served or parole), judicial indemnity, and reversal by trial or
appellate court.147 The second category consisted of unofficial ac-
141. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 23-24 ('[IThe risk of ekecuting the inmo-
cent is largely unknown . .. but if what has already been presented fails to convince
the reader of the fallibility of human judgment then nothing will'") (citation omitted). The
authors attribute the widespread belief that there is a low risk of erroneous conviction to
two factors. The first factor is a study published by the United States Congress in the
early 20th century stating that there had been no unjust convictions. Id. The results of
this study, however, were based on an unrecorded number of negative responses from
prison wardens answering the question whether they had personal knowledge of any erro-
neous convictions. Id. The second factor is the lack of publicity of erroneous convictions.
Id. The authors include comments they characterize as typical, such as: "wrongful convic-
tions have become so rare as to justify no argument against the death penalty on that
ground." Id. at 24 n.18 (citing 33 CURRENT HIST. 356, 361 (1930)).
142. L at 23 (noting the dearth of such research).
143. Id.
144. Id. A "potentially capital" case is any case where the sentencer had statutory au-
thority to impose death but instead chose a lesser sentence of imprisonment. Id. at 31.
145. Id. at 34. Kidnapping, which can be a capital offense, was excluded. Also, only
rape cases where the defendant was sentenced to death were included. The study did not
include cases where an accomplice was charged as a triggerman. Id. at 43 ("[B]ecause the
law does not nullify [the defendant's] culpability merely because he was not the trigger-
man, we do not treat him as innocent."). This is an interesting choice because a common
statutory mitigating factor is that the defendant was not the principal offender. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(6) (Baldwin 1992). In addition, the study excluded
cases of gross due process error notwithstanding the defendant's guilt or innocence, Bedau
& Radelet, supra note 13, at 41-42, and cases where conviction had been "fortuitously
averted" were also excluded from the study. Id. at 43.
146. Id. at 48.
147. Id. at 49-51. Indemnity occurs when the state legislature, by a special act, awards
a sum of money to a wrongly convicted person. Ild at 49. The authors note that a par-
don alone was not sufficient for inclusion in the category because sometimes pardons are
granted for reasons other than that the defendant was proven to be innocent. Id at 50.
Thus the pardon cases included were those where the grantor clearly believed the indi-
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tions that show innocence. 4 ' This category included a confession
by another person, another person implicated by evidence other
than a confession, opinion of a state official, and subsequent schol-
arly judgment. 49 The collaborators identified four types of error
which lead to these erroneous convictions: 1) police error;is° 2)
prosecutor error;15' 3) witness error; 52 and 4) other error. 53
For the following reasons, there may be an even higher number
of erroneous convictions than the 350 cases identified in the
Bedau-Radelet study. First, the collaborators greatly limited what
they defined to be "miscarriages of justice" by their methodological
choices."5 In addition, they did not include cases where the evi-
dence of innocence was "slight" or the research done was "unpro-
ductive." " Finally, the collaborators state that, in many cases,
they were unable to perform sufficient investigation in order to
make a determination.'56
vidual was innocent. Id In cases involving a reversal, only those cases where there was
acquittal after retrial or where the indictment was dismissed were included. Id at 51. Al-
though these acquittals and dismissals sometimes may have been due to other factors, for
the purposes of this study they were considered an official recognition of innocence. Id
148. Id. at 48-49.
149. Id. at 52-53.
150. Id. at 56-57 (coerced or other false confession, negligence, and other overzealous
police work).
151. Id. (suppression of exculpatory evidence and other overzealous prosecution).
152. Id. (mistaken eyewitness identification, perjury by prosecution witness, and unreli-
able or erroneous prosecution testimony).
153. Id. (misleading circumstantial evidence, incompetence of defense counsel, judicial
denial of admissibility of exculpatory evidence, inadequate consideration of alibi evidence,
erroneous judgment on cause of death, fraudulent alibi or false guilty plea made by de-
fendant, conviction demanded by community outrage, and unknown). The most frequent
error, occurring in more than half of the cases studied, was error by a witness. Id. at 60.
154. Id. at 26. The collaborators note that they included "far fewer" cases than all that
were investigated. Id.
155. Id. at 56. An example is a case where the Florida Supreme Court reversed the
convictions and, a year later, nolle prosequi (voluntary withdrawal of prosecution) was
entered. Id. The collaborators, however, were unable to find out anything else about the
case and thus did not include it. Id. (citing Platt v. State, 61 So. 502, 503 (1913)).
156.
In the vast majority of the excluded cases we simply could not obtain or could
not sufficiently investigate the facts to permit us to reach a satisfactory con-
clusion . . . . [We do not list them or give reasons for exclusion] lest we
thereby foster an illusion of authority and finality for our work that we believe
is unwarranted.
Id. at 27. One example is the assertion supposedly made by the late Don Reid, a Texas
journalist who witnessed many executions: "I'm sure there have been at least six or seven
executed in Texas for crimes they did not commit, and Lord only knows how many died
for crimes they did commit but whose punishment was too severe." Id. (quoting from
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Yet the results of this study provide support for the proposition
that the reasonable doubt standard is not infallible as a safeguard
against erroneous conviction."s Innocent individuals were con-
victed and some even executed' 8 in spite of the use of this stan-
dard. Although 350 cases within eighty-five years may be an ac-
ceptable amount to some,"" others may find this figure disturb-
ing, especially since it most likely understates the number of erro-
neous convictions." °
TIME, June 8, 1959, at 60). But see, Markman & Cassell, .supra note 130, at 152 n.194
( he authors' [Bedau and Radelet] protestations that their figures 'understate* the numbers
of innocent persons executed are unconvincing.").
157. See Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility, supra note 132, at 163 (noting that
the results of their study revealed that trial courts (judges and juries) can erroneously
render verdicts under the "reasonable doubt" standard).
Various solutions have been attempted to battle what not an insignificant number of
people find to be an inadequate standard of proof for conviction. See Margery M.
Koosed, Residual Doubt in the Post-Franklin v. Lynaugh Era, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb.
1989, 38, 41. These have ranged from disallowing a death sentence in the absence of
absolute certainty to "legislating a more demanding definition of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt." Id
158. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 73. Of those cases which the authors
were able to thoroughly investigate, innocent persons had been erroneously executed in
twenty-three of them. Id. at 72-73.
159. Markman & Cassell, supra note 130, at 121 (arguing that the Bedau-Radelet study
"wholly fails to demonstrate an unacceptable risk of executing the innocent [but t]o the
contrary it confirms ... the view that the risk is too small to be a significant factor in
the debate over the death penalty"). These authors also state that, in their opinion, the
study is flawed. Id. at 123-45. First, the category "potentially capital" is misleading and
thus includes too many cases. Id. at 123-24 (some of the "potentially capital" cases were
those where a life sentence was imposed or were in states where there is not even the
death penalty). Second, the twenty-three individuals who were actually executed make up
only 0.33% of the total number of executions (about 7000) thus far in this century. Id. at
125 n.22. Third, only one of the executions occurred within the past twenty-five years,
thus consistent with the recent increase in protection afforded individuals in capital sen-
tencing. Id. at 124. Finally, these authors were not persuaded with Professors Bedau and
Radelet's determinations of innocence. Id. at 126-45 (characterizing their "methodology" as
"subjective"). Professors Bedau and Radelet replied to these criticisms. See generally
Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility, supra note 134, at 161. They state that the
"discrepancy between [Markman and Cassell's] characterizations and what we actually
asserted, argued, and implied is so great that it warrants at least a brief response." Id. at
161. First, without providing a superior methodology, "mere disagreement" with the evi-
dence evaluations in the cases does not "impeach" their work. Id. at 162. Second, stating
that the Bedau-Radelet study did not reveal an unacceptable rate of erroneous execution
(0.33%) is misleading itself because Bedau and Radelet only investigated "a small frac-
tion" of all executions (about 7000) in this century. Id. at 165. Also, "given the coinci-
dences and sheer luck in many cases that led to eventual exoneration of innocent persons
on death row (not to mention our chance discovery of many of these cases), it is likely
that among these 7000+ executions, there are many more than the twenty-three cases we
cite in the executed-but-innocent category . . . ." Id. (footnotes omitted).
160. Id. at 165 n.31. These authors refer to a poll indicating that 15% of Americans
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• 2. Irrevocability of Erroneous Death Sentences
As noted above, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard ap-
plied in capital sentencing is not infallible, and erroneous sentenc-
ing may occur. An erroneous death sentence is irrevocable, and
therefore less tolerable than an erroneous life sentence. This propo-
sition was illustrated by Justice Marshall, who stated:
It has often been noted that one of the most fearful
aspects of the death penalty is its finality. There is simply
no possibility of correcting a mistake. The horror of send-
ing an innocent defendant to death is thus qualitatively
different from the horror of falsely imprisoning that defen-
dant. The belief that such an ultimate and final penalty is
inappropriate where there are doubts as to guilt, even if
they do not rise to the level necessary for acquittal, is a
feeling that stems from common sense and fundamental
notions of justice. 6
Although some argue that the appeals process sufficiently pro-
tects the innocent death sentence, 162 when the process is some-
how rendered inadequate 63 or if it simply expires before the ac-
cused can prove her innocence, she will be executed.r'4 Because
who oppose the death penalty oppose it because of the risk of erroneous execution. Id.
(citing GALLUP REPORT, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3). Thus, the authors conclude that "concern
over executing the innocent remains an important factor for many Americans who oppose
the death penalty." Id.
161. Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920, 921-22 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari) (jury recommendation of life overridden by the trial judge). In Spanziano
v. Florida, three Justices noted- that a jury might not sentence to death because of "the
possibility that an irrevocable mistake might be made." 468 U.S. 447, 488, n.34 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1977) (stating that no
modifying or corrective mechanisms are available to a death sentencee).
162. Markman & Cassell, supra note 130, at 147-48. These authors state that post-con-
viction and collateral review appeals, executive clemency, and other procedures provide the
protection necessary to prevent erroneous execution. Id.
163. See Joseph M. Giarratano, "To the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been
Wrong': Fallibility v. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005, 1006 & nn.
8-9 (1991). The author, once a death row inmate and subsequently released by executive
clemency, argues that the appeals process recently has been limited in ways so that an in-
nocent individual might not be adequately protected. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149 (1990) (holding that when a defendant waived his right to appeal, that
death row inmate lacks standing to challenge the validity of his death sentence)). See also
Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility, supra note 134, at 165 (stating that in many
of the cases investigated, 'coincidences" and "sheer luck" were what led to "eventual
exoneration of innocent persons on death row").
164. See Giarratano, supra note 163, at 1010 (describing a case in which an innocent
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permitting residual doubt as a relevant mitigating factor would
enable a jury to consider its remaining doubt and thus recommend
a life sentence, residual doubt can serve as an additional, and
arguably necessary, safeguard against erroneous conviction. 65
In addition to keeping an innocent person alive, residual doubt
might also facilitate that person's subsequent release.1t The Mod-
el Penal Code, in recognition of the benefits which a life sentence
confers upon an innocent individual, has included residual doubt in
its list of mitigating factors." 7 The authors of the Model Penal
Code state that the "provision is an accommodation to the irrevoca-
bility of the capital sanction. Where doubt of guilt remains, the
opportunity to reverse a conviction on the basis of new evidence
must be preserved, and a sentence of death is obviously inconsis-
tent with that goal."16
Therefore, due to the fallibility of the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, and the irrevocability of the imposition of a death
sentence, residual doubt is a necessary mitigating factor to be ap-
plied in capital sentencing.69 The following section sets forth
guidelines for such an application.
IV. PRACTICAL APPuCATION OF RESIDUAL DOUBT IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING
Although residual doubt is an important mitigating factor in
capital sentencing, its application is not desirable in all cases. Re-
sidual doubt should be argued during the mitigation phase only
man would have been executed but a delay allowed him enough time to prove his inno-
cence). The author notes that often exoneration occurs fortuitously after the appeals pro-
cess has expired. Id. The author also states that if the length of time for the appellate
process is limited by legislation, then innocent persons could be "executed long before
their innocence ris] discovered." Id.
165. See Heiney, 469 U.S. at 921-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. See Mary E. Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
973, 1021 (1985) (noting that the irrevocability of a death sentence offers no redetermina-
tion of a prisoner's fate).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1980). This section
states that a death sentence shall not be imposed if "although the evidence suffices to
sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilL" Id.
One commentator, however, has noted that it is very difficult for a life sentencee to gain
release. Gale, supra note 166, at 1093.
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmL 5.
169. See Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 881 (1985) (denying cert.) (Marshall, I., dis-
senting). Justice Marshall stated: "Mhe possibility of an irrevocable mistake is a valid
reason" to recommend life because of the fallibility of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. Id.
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when the attorney deems such an argument appropriate. Once an
attorney decides to make a residual doubt argument to the jury, the
attorney should make sure that the argument is well-grounded in
the evidence of the case and should attempt to convince the jury
that its residual doubt could be genuine. In addition, a jury instruc-
tion should always be given when a residual doubt argument is
made.
A. Determining When Residual Doubt Arguments are
Appropriate
If a state recognizes residual doubt as a nonstatutory mitigating
factor, 7 ' then the defense attorney is permitted to present a resid-
ual doubt argument to the jury during mitigation. However, this
should be done only when, in light of the circumstances of the
case, the attorney concludes that such an argument is appropriate.
There are several considerations which can guide the attorney
in assessing whether the jury retains some residual doubt, and
therefore, whether she should proceed with a residual doubt argu-
ment. First, the attorney should carefully examine the evidence the
government presented at trial to ascertain whether it contained any
arguable weaknesses, or even exculpatory implications.' Also,
the attorney should regard her own doubt about her client's guilt as
a strong indication of similar doubts the jury might possess.Y
Finally, the attorney should consider the length of time that the
jury deliberated and whether it returned guilty verdicts for every
count in the indictment7 , as well as any other manifestations by
the jury which suggest it still harbors some doubt.
170. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing states where residual
doubt is allowed in mitigation argument),
171. As the Georgia study indicated, the weaker the government's case, the greater the
likelihood that the jury will recommend a life sentence. See Barnett, supra note 119, at
1339. See also State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1991). In Watson the Ohio Su-
preme Court discussed how certain evidence might have caused the jury to retain residual
doubt. Id. at 111. For example, there were witnesses who testified that the offender was
not the defendant, and the key prosecution witness had a motive to lie. Id.
172. See Michael L. Radelet, Sociologists as Expert Witnesses in Capital Cases: A Case
Study, in EXPERT WITNESSES: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 119, 122 (Patrick R.
Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987) [hereinafter Case Study (discussing the
fact that the defense attorneys themselves had lingering doubt because of certain exculpa-
tory evidence suppressed at trial).
173. See id. at 121. At a trial where Professor Radelet testified, the defense attorneys
believed that the jury may have had lingering doubt because after 25 days of deliberation
they convicted the defendant of only two of the ten counts. Id.
174. See State v. Bonnell, 573 N.E.2d 1082, 1090 (Ohio 1991) (discussing a jury note
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Even when a jury has convicted the defendant, it might still
retain a degree of doubt which is not based on "whim." Rather,
this lingering doubt could be genuine because due to the risk of
erroneous conviction under thd "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard, the defendant may be truly innocent. Finally, because juries
find residual doubt relevant and apply it to their sentencing calcu-
lus anyway, residual doubt has become an "operative" mitigating
factor. Therefore, in making a residual doubt argument to the jury,
the attorney validates the jury's instincts and eliminates the confu-
sion in the application of its lingering doubt, thus enabling the jury
to make a more informed and well reasoned decision.
It is conceivable that residual doubt might become subject to
"abuse" because it could potentially be argued in every case and
appeal. This would not only be a drain on judicial resources, but
might also result in "undeserving" benefactors receiving life sen-
tences. There are, however, some natural mechanisms that would
substantially limit such "abuse."
First, residual doubt is applied only at the jury's election. If
the jury does not harbor any such doubt, or decides it is not strong
enough to outweigh the aggravating circumstances of the case, then
the jury simply will not apply it."5
This recently occurred during the sentencing of a man convict-
ed of murder. 76 After the jury had recommended the death sen-
tence, this author spoke with one of the jurors. 77 The juror stat-
ed that the defense attorney had argued residual doubt to the jury
and the judge had instructed them on it.'78 However, although the
jury did revisit the evidence and discuss the residual doubt factor
during its deliberation, it chose not to apply residual doubt as a
to the judge inquiring whether the jury could treat doubt and 'not fully disclosed' evi-
dence as a mitigating factor).
175. See Barnett, supra note 119, at 1339-41 (the higher the degree of certainty a jury
has as to whether the defendant was actually the killer, the greater the likelihood of a
death sentence). See also Sundby, Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 58, at 501. This
author states that "[a]lthough it may not be empirically provable, most jurors likely begin
with skepticism toward a defendant's claim of justification or excuse." Id. In addition, he
refers to a study which "suggests that although jurors on a limited basis import their own
values into rendering a verdict, 'there is every indication that the jury follows the evi-
dence and understands the case.'" Id. at 501, n.165 (citation omitted).
176. Telephone interview with Juror, Case Not Disclosed, (November 18, 1991). Because
this case is pending appeal from conviction and imposition of a death sentence, this au-
thor has chosen to keep confidential the case citation.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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mitigating circumstance. 79 The jury understood that it had the
ability to do so, but opted not to include residual doubt in its
sentencing calculus.'
Second, the defense attorney will only argue residual doubt
during mitigation if, after evaluating the circumstances of the case,
she decides that such an argument is appropriate. If the attorney is
doing her job properly, she will tactically choose not to argue
residual doubt in certain cases.' A residual doubt argument not
only has the potential to distract the jury, but it may also have the
undesirable effect of diluting other more compelling mitigation
arguments based on the circumstances of the case. For example, if
there had been a strong showing that the defendant was under
mental duress at the time the offense was committed, the defense
attorney would most likely choose not to argue residual doubt. In
such a situation, the jury might not only be distracted or offended
by a residual doubt argument, but it may even become skeptical of
any other mitigation arguments which the attorney makes."r
Therefore, tactical decisions not to argue residual doubt will serve
as an effective limiting mechanism.
B. Guidelines on Making the Residual Doubt Argument
Once an attorney determines that a residual doubt argument is
appropriate, the attorney should structure her argument to address
the facts in the case in an attempt to convince the jury that feel-
ings of residual doubt are legitimate. The court should give specific
instructions regarding residual doubt to the jury.
1. The First Prong of a Residual Doubt Argument: Specific
Grounding in the Evidence of the Case
Once the defense attorney determines that a residual doubt
argument is appropriate, she should craft an argument that specifi-
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Making tactical decisions as to mitigation arguments in capital cases is well-recog-
nized and accepted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (counsel
only has a duty to make "reasonable" tactical decisions).
182. Tennessee Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, TooLs FOR THE ULTIMATE TRIAL:
THE TACDL DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 4:50 (1985) ("The practice [of arguing
residual doubt] should be approached cautiously, due to the fact that the jury may be
insulted that you would seek to persuade them of the accused's innocence once they have
found him or her guilty."). See also Alfred R.N. Cross, THE GOLDEN THREAD OF THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 13-14 (1976) ([Mhe more improbable the defence [sic], the
harder it is to believe.-).
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cally explains why the jury might harbor some lingering doubt. A
general argument that the defendant is innocent or that the jury is
wrong is ineffective and risks offending the jury. An example of
such an argument is that presented in the Watson case where the
defense attorney merely argued that the jury was wrong and "Wat-
son would ultimately be vindicated."' 83 It is not surprising that
the jury recommended a death sentence in light of this weak argu-
ment, despite the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court itself found its
lingering doubt sufficient to-reverse the death sentence."'
The defense attorney in Watson should have made specific
reference to the evidence in the case that potentially raised some
doubt about the defendant's guilt. Such evidence included the testi-
mony of "disinterested" eye witnesses, including a woman who
stated that the defendant was "absolutely not" the offender, and the
prosecution's key witness, whose credibility was questionable be-
cause she had a motive to lie.' By focusing the jury's attention
on this kind of evidence, the attorney would have been able to
make a more effective residual doubt mitigation argument.
2. The Second Prong of the Residual Doubt Argument:
Persuading the Jury that its Residual Doubt Could Be Genuine
The defense attorney should attempt to persuade the jury that it
may have erroneously convicted an innocent person. The defense
attorney should inform the jury that the purpose of allowing residu-
al doubt as a mitigating factor is to protect an innocent individual
from being erroneously executed. First, the attorney should explain
that this protection is necessary because death is an irrevocable
sentence. Next the attorney should argue that any remaining doubt
the jury harbors could be genuine because the standard of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt" is not infallible.
If the judge will allow it, a persuasive method to accomplish
this is through expert testimony. The Bedau-Radelet study provides
an illustration.'86 Dr. Radelet, a professor of sociology, testified
at the mitigation phase of the capital case Maxwell v. Superior
183. State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 111 (Ohio 1991). See also Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 174-75 & n.7 (1988) (no argument was made on residual doubt during the
presentation of mitigating evidence or at closing except for a general reference to human
fallibility).
184. See Watson, 572 N.E.2d at 111 (stating that the evidence presented was not suffi-
cient to support a sentence of death).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 143-60 and accompanying text.
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Court of Los Angeles.t"7 In that case, the defense attorneys sus-
pected that the jury harbored residual doubt despite the fact that it
had convicted Maxwell. t88 The attorneys wanted to persuade the
jury that this doubt could be genuine and to impress upon the jury
the consequences of residual doubt in capital cases.'89 The de-
fense believed that presenting the systematic research of the Bedau-
Radelet study in conjunction with a lingering doubt argument
would be effective."tg The jury responded to this strategy by rec-
ommending a life sentence."t '
This case is unusual because the prosecution made no objection
to any of the testimony."9 Often prosecutors do object to this
type of expert testimony, and judges rule in their favor. 93 Social
science testimony is controversial. The major complaint is that
social scientists are biased toward their causes." 4 One commen-
tator has stated that "[s]ocial scientists testifying in court have been
criticized for confusing science and policy and for allowing social
science to become social advocacy."' s
The problem of expert bias, however, is not unmanageable.
First, as with any witness, opposing counsel has the ability to
reveal any bias to the jury.'96 Also, tactically, the defense should
187. 639 P.2d 248 (Cal. 1982). See also Case Study, supra note 172, at 120 (discussing
testimony in the Maxwell case).
188. Id. at 122. The defense attorneys themselves had lingering doubt because of certain
exculpatory evidence suppressed at trial. Id In addition they felt the jury may have had
lingering doubt because after 25 days of deliberation they convicted the defendant of only
two of the ten counts. Id at 121.
189. Id. at 122-23.
190. Id. In addition, other testimony was presented, including that of an individual con-
victed of murder who later cleared his name, several former San Quentin prison staff
members, including the officer in charge of executions, and a journalist who had seen
executions. Id at 127-28.
191. Id at 128. "Post-verdict interviews with jurors by the defense attorneys revealed
that while, at the end of the guilt phase, ten of them favored death for the defendant, the
strategy during the penalty phase was responsible for shifting their opinions." Id (citation
omitted).
192. Id. at 126 (rather, the prosecution attempted to show the limits of such research).
193. See id. at 127 (stating that the admissibility of such testimony is unclear in various
jurisdictions and that Dr. Radelet has been precluded from testifying in several cases).
194. See Sandra Evans Skovron & Joseph E. Scott, Social Scientists as Expert Witness-
es: Their Use, Misuse and Sonetines Abuse, in EXPERT WITNESsEs: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN
THE COURTROOM 73, 76 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987)
(arguing that academic experts have certain ideological biases that move them initially to
practice in a particular area).
195. Id. (citing D. Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE LJ. 1086
(1972) and E.P. Wolf, Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case, 42 PUB-
LIC INTERET 102 (1976)).
196. Skovron & Scott, supra note 194, at 76 ("If a researcher does not recognize his
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not retain a blatantly biased expert, and should prepare any witness
for direct and cross-examination. 97 Finally, many expert witness-
es prefer to play the role of "value-neutralist" as opposed to advo-
cate.'98 Although there may be a risk that some social scientists
are biased, to exclude categorically social scientists solely for this
reason is unnecessary.
There also may be criticism that such testimony is superfluous
because it does not relate specifically to the legal questions in
dispute." Yet, the testimony in Maxwell regarding the Bedau-
Radelet study provided the jury with additional information which
helped it to more reasonably evaluate its own lingering doubt.2"e
Such testimony, then, can assist the trier of fact in understanding
residual doubt and its implications.
In addition, the prosecution may find sociological testimony
helpful. Research need not be used solely as a defensive tool.
Perhaps studies on residual doubt indicating those who really bene-
fit from its application would prove useful to the prosecution. As
long as residual doubt is deemed relevant in capital sentencing,
neither the defense nor the prosecution should be precluded from
using expert testimony to assist the jury in making its decision re-
garding its application.
own biases and deal with them . . . he will certainly be reminded of them by the oppo-
sition in court.").
197. Id. at 91-92 (discussing the importance of choosing and working carefully with an
expert witness so that the social science data is presented effectively).
198. See Case Study, supra note 172, at 125 ("On the stand, I adhere to a strict posi-
tion of value neutrality, and I consider my personal opinions about the death penalty and
the fact that I am serving as a defense witness totally irrelevant when deciding how to
answer posited questions."). See also, L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. & Patrick R. Anderson,
Pragmatism and Advocacy in Criminal Justice Expert Witnessing, in EXPERT WITNESSEs:
CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 36, 38 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree,
Jr. eds., 1987) (stating that although some experts serve as advocates, slanting their testi-
mony and concealing damaging facts, others reject the "advocacy stance in'favor of objec-
tively presenting both sides of the issues."); Skovron & Scott, supra note 194, at 85.
These authors state:
Although a social scientist may be prompted to enter the legal setting
by strong feelings about the matter being litigated, the social scientist is not
there to argue or further his own opinions. He is there to offer his professional
opinion on the legal controversy.
Id.
199. See itd at 83 ("What may appear to be extremely relevant and significant to a
social scientist may not be relevant or admissible in the legal arena.").
200. See Case Study, supra note 173, at 127.
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3. The Necessity of a Jury Instruction
As mentioned previously, the utility of residual doubt is signifi-
cantly undercut when the judge refuses to give an instruction.20'
Again, using Bonnell as an example, despite the fact that juries
may often have lingering doubt and want to apply it, the refusal of
an instruction could hinder them from doing so. 2°2 In the alterna-
tive, juries may resort to applying residual doubt even if they are
uncertain. 3 This confusion may result in inconsistent deci-
sions.
204
An analogy might be made to jury nullification, the "de facto"
or implicit power to acquit the defendant "regardless of the
strength of the evidence against him.205 Whether jury nullifica-
tion is an actual right of juries to vote their consciences or merely
a description of reality, the moderate view holds that the conces-
sion of jury nullification "does not automatically require that juries
should be so informed."2 06 The rationale is based on the risk that
juries, when instructed on their rights, will be less inclined to de-
cide cases on their merits than by personal bias.20 7
This departure from a jury's normal function can lead to incon-
201. See supra notes 80-89, 125-28 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Bonnell case).
203. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 27-34 (commenting that residual
doubt was the most frequently cited explanatory factor in the life sentence recommenda-
tions of the jurors interviewed).
204. See Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 52 (arguing that a standard in-
struction on residual doubt "enhances [the jury's] sense of responsibility, as it is giving
effect to the 'consciences of the jurors, for only they know the certainty with which they
voted the defendant guilty.- (quoting Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 882 (1985)). Thus,
residual doubt may help keep the jury's attention focused on the case itself and not on
any unacceptable factor - i.e., not a mitigating or aggravating circumstance - such as
race or status of the victim. Koosed, Lingering Doubt, supra note 15, at 52.
205. Cargill v. State, 340 S.E.2d 891, 914 (Ga. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101
(1987) (commenting that the jury possesses a de facto power of nullification, yet still has
a duty to convict the defendant if the evidence proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt). See
generally Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The hnpact of Judicial Instructions, Argu-
ments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 439-41
(1988) (discussing the history of jury nullification and competing views regarding the
consequences of instructing the jury on nullification).
206. Horowitz outlines three positions on the issue of jury nullification. The first posits
that juries have historically had, and exercised, the power to nullify the law. Hiding this
fact from the jury would serve no useful purpose. The moderate, or intermediate, view ac-
knowledges the power yet holds that it ought not be admitted or exercised. Finally, the
radical interpretation argues that no such right to nullify exists. Id. at 441.
207. Id. at 440-42.
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sistent verdicts.208 Research shows that juries have convicted for
reasons such as public indignation at high crime rates, lack of
sympathy for the defendant, and the heinous nature of a crime.
2 °
Alternatively, juries have acquitted when they felt sympathy for the
defendant or felt the governing law was wrong.210 If juries seem
to ignore their responsibility to decide cases on their merits, based
on the law, when informed of their nullification ability, then argu-
ably juries should not be so informed.
Following this line of reasoning, juries also should not be
instructed on residual doubt because they might ignore statutory
sentencing guidelines. Residual doubt, however, can be distin-
guished from jury nullification. First, -the premise of jury nullifica-
tion is the ability of the jury to acquit or show mercy even if the
jury thinks the defendant is guilty.21  A direct parallel would be
a jury's use of mercy in capital sentencing even though the jury
thinks the defendant is guilty. Residual doubt, however, is not the
same thing as mercy. 12 Instead, when a jury has residual doubt
the jury still thinks that there is a slight possibility that the defen-
dant is innocent. Although a jury faithfully followed the reasonable
doubt rule in returning a guilty verdict, that same jury does not
want to recommend the irrevocable sentence of death.
In addition, jury nullification can result in a decision to acquit
or convict based on some external sentiment or bias.2 3 Residual
doubt is not an arbitrary or biased sentiment, but is anchored to
the merits.2" 4 Therefore, the dangers of informing a jury of its
nullification ability are not really analogous to instructing a jury on
residual doubt.
208. Id. at 441-42.
209. Id. For example, jury convictions were higher in draft evasion cases when the war
was popular than when the war lacked public support. Ic. at 441 (citing James P. Levine,
Tim LEGISLATiVE ROLE OF JURIES, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 605, 605-34 (1984)). Research
with mock juries revealed that with nullification information, juries convicted in drunk
driving cases at a higher rate. Horowitz, supra note 205, at 450.
210. See Horowitz, supra note 205, at 450-52 (observing that research revealed a lower
rate of conviction in cases involving euthanasia and charges for illegal weapon posses-
sion).
211. I. at 439 ("[J]ury nullification . . . has historically permitted sympathetic juries to
acquit those who are legally guilty but morally upright.').
212. See supra note 204 (distinguishing inappropriate mitigating factors from residual
doubt).
213. See Horowitz, supra note 205, at 442 (juries were more likely to convict when
"they were unsympathetic to the defendant and the nature of the crime').
214. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing how residual doubt can be
genuine doubt as to the merits of the case).
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C. A Proposed Jury Instruction
The following is a proposed jury instruction written by this
author that should be given to the jury whenever the defendant has
made a residual doubt argument.
You convicted the defendant because, after deliberation,
you had no reasonable doubt as to his/her guilt. You may,
however, have had some small amount of doubt as to the
defendant's guilt that did not rise to the level of reasonable
doubt. I call this small amount of doubt "residual doubt."
You are allowed, in your sentencing deliberation, to weigh
any residual doubt you have, against the aggravating cir-
cumstance(s) of the offense, just like you may do with any
other mitigating factor. If this remaining doubt you have is
"whimsical" in nature as opposed to actually based on the
evidence that you saw and heard at trial, then you should
not treat that as residual doubt and should not weigh it
against the aggravating circumstance(s). By "whimsical" I
mean any doubt that is imaginary or fanciful. In addition,
if you are hesitant to recommend a death sentence because
your conscience is bothering you, you need to determine
why this is so. If you are hesitant simply because you want
to show the defendant mercy or you are generally troubled
or queasy about the death penalty, then your hesitation is
not based on residual doubt. If, however, you are hesitant
because there is something about any of the evidence from
trial that troubles you, despite not giving you reasonable
doubt, then this is residual doubt, and may be properly
weighed against the aggravating circumstance(s) of the
offense.
Arguably, this instruction is consistent with the mandate set
forth in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in California v. Brown,
that the jury's sentence recommendation be a "reasoned moral"
decision.215 First, the proposed jury instruction does not allow the
jury to treat any hesitation it may have, because of its desire to
show mercy, as residual doubt. 16 Second, the jury instruction re-
quires that the jury's residual doubt be based on the evidence of
215. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
216. See id. at 543 (upholding a jury instruction that warned the jury not to recommend
life because of "mere sympathy").
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the case, and not on whim.
Thus, the proposed jury instruction enables the jury to consider
properly in mitigation any residual doubt it may have.
V. CONCLUSION
Residual doubt is not a uniformly accepted mitigating circum-
.stance in capital sentencing. The Supreme Court has not recognized
residual doubt as a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor and
thus has deferred the issue to state determination. Certain states ex-
pressly reject residual doubt as a mitigating factor. In other states,
though not expressly rejecting the concept of residual doubt, judi-
"cial refusal to instruct on residual doubt demonstrates a reluctance
to accept residual doubt as a mitigating factor. This lack of accep-
tance appears to be based on the fact that residual doubt does not
fit the conventional definition of a mitigating factor.
Residual doubt is, however, an appropriate and necessary miti-
gating factor. First, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard al-
lows a jury to convict even while retaining some actual doubt.
Since the reasonable doubt standard is not an infallible safeguard
against erroneous conviction, the jury's residual doubt could be
genuine. Residual doubt, then, provides an additional safeguard in
capital sentencing, where the punishment is irrevocable. Further,
research suggests that residual doubt is currently acting as an "op-
erative" mitigating factor, as juries use it in their determination of
life sentences.
Rather than the random application of residual doubt that cur-
rently exists among and within states, this note proposes a system-
atic approach to the application of residual doubt in capital sen-
tencing. First, the defense attorney's residual doubt argument
should be grounded on the evidence and made only when the
attorney believes the jury may have residual doubt. This will pre-
vent overuse of residual doubt arguments. Second, a residual doubt
instruction should always be given by the court. This instruction
should distinguish residual doubt from other inappropriate consider-
ations such as race. Additionally, the instruction should make clear
that residual doubt is not doubt based on a fleeting whim or fancy,
but rather is genuine doubt about the propriety of the conviction.
Then residual doubt will not simply be a symbolic hook upon
which the jury can hang its conscience. Instead, allowing residual
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
doubt to be considered as a mitigating factor will enable the jury
to recommend life when it is not absolutely certain that the person
who has been convicted actually committed the crime.
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